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LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 This case principally involves an issue of first 
impression for this court:  can extreme delay in an alternative 
  
forum render that forum inadequate for purposes of assessing a 
forum non conveniens motion?  We answer that question in the 
affirmative, and then address a number of issues arising from the 
trial of this matter. 
 This case comes to us after final judgment in rem in 
favor of plaintiff Urvashi Bhatnagar, a young female Indian 
national, against Surrendra Overseas Ltd. ("Surrendra"), an 
Indian shipping company, Apeejay Lines, an unincorporated 
division of Surrendra,1 and the M/V APJ KARAN, an Indian vessel, 
for injuries that Urvashi sustained aboard the APJ KARAN on the 
high seas.  In 1991, while six-year old Urvashi was playing a 
"game" with one of the ship's crew on the bridge of the APJ 
KARAN, her right hand and arm were severely lacerated when they 
came in contact with a device used to repel water from the 
windows of the bridge. 
 Urvashi and her mother, Kalpana, sued Surrendra in 
federal court in New York under the court's admiralty 
jurisdiction, then transferred the action to the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania.  After discovery, Surrendra filed a series of 
motions seeking to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of forum 
non conveniens.  The district court denied the motions, however, 
                     
1
.   Surrendra states in its brief that ApeeJay "is not a legal 
entity" (Appellant-Cross-Appellee's Br. 5), and in its answer to 
the Bhatnagars' complaint, Surrendra alleged that "there is not a 
separate corporation as ApeeJay Lines."  Joint Appendix 
("J.A.") 2.  The Bhatnagars accept Surrendra's characterization 
of ApeeJay.  Appellees-Cross-Appellants' Br. 4.  We treat 
Surrendra, ApeeJay, and the APJ KARAN as one defendant for 
purposes of this appeal. 
  
and after a two-day bench trial during which the court purported 
to apply Indian law, the court awarded Urvashi a total of 
$189,331.00 in damages.  Surrendra appeals the judgment, and 
Urvashi and her mother cross-appeal.  We will affirm in most 
respects but will remand for a redetermination of damages under 
Indian law. 
 I. 
 A. 
 The Bhatnagars are a family of Indian citizens.  Sanjay 
Bhatnagar, Urvashi's father, was hired in India as an assistant 
engineer aboard the vessel APJ KARAN, one of eight vessels owned 
and operated in international commerce by Surrendra.  Sanjay 
boarded the APJ KARAN in the Indian territory of Goa in November 
1990.  With Surrendra's permission, Sanjay's wife, son and 
daughter were to join him on the vessel. 
 The family had planned to board the vessel in India 
with Sanjay, but were unable to obtain the requisite visas.  With 
the Surrendra's assistance, however, Sanjay's wife Kalpana 
Bhatnagar and her two children flew to the United States and 
boarded the ship in Portland, Oregon, where the APJ KARAN took on 
a cargo of grain destined for Alexandria, Egypt. 
 On board the APJ KARAN, rules and regulations 
designated areas where unauthorized people were not allowed to 
go.  Notices were posted in several places indicating which areas 
were off limits.  For example, there was a sign posted at the top 
of the stairs leading to the bridge which said "off limits," and 
a sign posted outside the radio room which said "Navigators 
  
Only."  The captain of the APJ KARAN testified that he spoke with 
Sanjay Bhatnagar and his family and instructed them not to enter 
the restricted areas, and Sanjay also testified that he spoke 
with his family concerning the areas they were not allowed to 
visit. 
 Despite these rules, on March 17, 1991, the ship's 
steward took Urvashi to the bridge -- an "off limits" area -- 
while he was serving tea to the duty officer.  Once on the 
bridge, the steward left Urvashi, and the six-year old approached 
the helmsman.  The helmsman picked her up and placed her upon a 
railing facing the windows and a "clearview screen," a device 
which repels rain and other moisture by revolving at a high rate 
of speed.  It was rainy that day, and the clearview screen 
revolved rapidly to provide the helm with an unimpeded view of 
the ocean ahead. 
 For some reason, the helmsman decided to show Urvashi 
how to play a "game":  he feigned putting his hand on the 
clearview screen, then encouraged her to do the same.  However, 
when Urvashi followed the helmsman's lead her hand slipped, and 
the clearview screen severely injured her right hand and portions 
of her arm. 
 The APJ KARAN was steaming in international waters when 
the accident occurred.  The captain immediately radioed for help 
and was transferred to the United States Coast Guard, which 
directed the captain to divert the vessel to the nearest 
landfall.  That turned out to be the island of Antigua, and 
Urvashi, her brother and her mother were evacuated there. 
  
 After receiving emergency medical treatment on Antigua, 
on March 20, 1991 Urvashi and her mother and brother flew to New 
York, where their relatives, who are doctors, arranged for 
further medical assistance.  The three Bhatnagars (later joined 
by Sanjay) entered the United States on emergency medical visas 
valid for six months. 
  Despite the expiration of their emergency medical 
visas in September 1991, the Bhatnagars have remained in New York 
living with relatives since the accident.  Urvashi has undergone 
therapy for her wounds and has attended school in West Islip, New 
York.  In all, Urvashi had a series of six operations from March 
1991 through May 1992 to repair her hand. 
 B. 
 Urvashi and Kalpana Bhatnagar brought suit in September 
1992 against Surrendra, ApeeJay Lines, and the APJ KARAN in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York.  Urvashi alleged negligence, lack of adequate medical care 
and gross negligence, and Kalpana claimed loss of services 
resulting from the injuries to her daughter.  When the APJ KARAN 
was docked at the Port of Philadelphia in October 1992, however, 
the plaintiffs transferred the case to the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and Surrendra 
issued to the plaintiffs a letter of undertaking of $2 million in 
lieu of the vessel's arrest and detention in Philadelphia. 
 After substantial discovery, Surrendra moved to dismiss 
the Bhatnagar's complaint on the ground that it was barred by the 
  
forum selection clause in Sanjay Bhatnagar's employment contract2 
or, alternatively, that the district court should exercise its 
discretion and dismiss the case under the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens.  The district court denied the initial motion, denied 
Surrendra's motion for reconsideration or certification of the 
forum non conveniens ruling under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), and also 
denied a second motion for reconsideration filed after further 
discovery.  Thus, the case went to trial. 
 The district court, after a bench trial in which it 
purported to apply Indian law, awarded Urvashi $33,133 in 
pecuniary damages for past medical expenses, $6,000 for future 
medical expenses, and $150,000 for pain and suffering, 
disability, disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of life, mental 
anguish and emotional injury.  The court ruled in favor of 
Surrendra on Kalpana Bhatnagar's claims, finding that she had not 
proven any loss of service or psychiatric injury as a result of 
Urvashi's injuries. 
 Surrendra appeals the denial of the district court's 
rulings with respect to forum non conveniens and also contends 
that the district court made numerous errors at trial.  Urvashi 
and Kalpana Bhatnagar cross-appeal the adequacy of the judgment 
in favor of Urvashi and also challenge the district court's 
judgment in favor of Surrendra on Kalpana Bhatnagar's claims.  
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
                     
2
.   This ground is not pressed by Surrendra on appeal. 
  
 II. 
 Surrendra makes three claims of error:  (1) the 
district court abused its discretion when it failed to dismiss 
the case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens; (2) the 
court erred in imposing liability upon Surrendra; and (3) the 
court erroneously calculated Urvashi's damages.  We address each 
of these issues in turn. 
 A. 
 It is undisputed that the parties in this case are 
Indian nationals and the ship on which Urvashi's accident 
occurred was an Indian-flagged ship on the high seas.  Before the 
district court rejected Surrendra's motion to dismiss on the 
grounds of forum non conveniens and proceeded to trial, the only 
links with the United States present in this case were the 
following:  (1) the Bhatnagars claim residence in the United 
States; (2) Urvashi was treated in the United States by doctors 
who were therefore available here to testify about the nature and 
extent of her injuries; and (3) the Bhatnagars were able to 
secure a letter of undertaking by Surrendra in the United States 
-- after the suit was filed -- when the APJ KARAN dropped anchor 
in the Port of Philadelphia. 
 Given these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that 
Surrendra argued to the district court that this case should be 
heard in India, rather than the United States.  Surrendra 
contended that the case had a close factual nexus with India and 
an absence of ties to the United States.  The company also 
submitted an affidavit of an Indian law expert noting that India 
  
has a well-developed legal system which would be able to handle 
the issues presented in this case.  Furthermore, although in 
effect conceding that the Indian legal system moves much less 
expeditiously than our domestic courts, Surrendra submitted 
another affidavit stating that if the case were refiled in India, 
it would join in petitioning the appropriate judicial officer for 
expedited hearing of the matter, and that it would not file any 
unnecessary pleadings or requests that would impede the case.  
Surrendra's legal expert, moreover, opined that because of 
Urvashi's young age, the Calcutta High Court (which would hear 
the case) "would undoubtedly grant an `expedited hearing' 
request" if the parties made such a motion.  Joint Appendix 
("J.A.") 240.  Despite Surrendra's arguments, however, the 
district court refused to dismiss. 
 Surrendra complains that the district court abused its 
discretion not only when it failed to grant this original motion, 
but also when it rejected Surrendra's motion for reconsideration 
and, later, rejected a second motion seeking reconsideration 
because of alleged discovery abuses by the Bhatnagars.  We 
conclude that none of Surrendra's contentions has merit. 
  
 1. 
  
 A district court's determination with respect to forum 
non conveniens "may be reversed only when there has been a clear 
abuse of discretion; where the court has considered all relevant 
public and private interest factors, and where its balancing of 
these factors is reasonable, its decision deserves substantial 
deference."  Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 932 F.2d 170, 178 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (Lacey II), quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 
U.S. 235, 257 (1981).  Certainly, our case law demands that we 
accord deference even to a trial court's decision to refuse to 
exercise its lawful jurisdiction, dismiss on grounds of forum non 
conveniens and deny the plaintiff the opportunity to litigate in 
a United States court.  Our deference should be at least as 
great, if not greater, when a district court decides not to 
dismiss.3  The district court is capable of measuring its own 
                     
3
.    A rough suggestion of the deference accorded district court 
decisions rejecting motions to dismiss on the ground of forum non 
conveniens is found in the case law:  while hundreds of forum non 
conveniens decisions have been reported over the years, one 
article concluded that, as of March 1991, only six reported 
decisions involved pretrial decisions not to dismiss.  See Note, 
Review and Appeal of Forum Non Conveniens and Venue Transfer 
Orders, 59 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 715 at 727-28 (1991).  "Only once 
did an appellate court reverse the denial of a motion to dismiss 
for forum non conveniens."  Id. at 728 (footnotes omitted).  That 
case was Gonzalez v. Naviera Neptuno A.A., 832 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 
1987), a case very different from the one before us.  In 
Gonzalez, "the overwhelming majority" of the witnesses were in 
the alternative jurisdiction, and the Fifth Circuit found there 
would be difficulties in enforcing a judgment against the 
defendant in the United States.  Gonzalez, 832 F.2d at 879.  
Here, by contrast, Urvashi and her mother, as well as Urvashi's 
treating physician, were present in the United States, and the 
letter of undertaking would make it possible to enforce a 
judgment against Surrendra in the United States.  Even more 
importantly, in Gonzalez there was no issue of whether the 
alternative forum in that case (Peru) was adequate.  As noted 
infra pp. 15-23, here that issue is dispositive. 
  
docket and assessing the practical administrative difficulties 
that may flow from denying such a motion.  Indeed, while we may 
be able to provide some perspective on the systemic consequences 
of individual denials of forum non conveniens motions -- in terms 
of future case load and other administrative difficulties that 
may result -- we are aware of no evidence suggesting that 
district courts are unable similarly to take the long view of a 
particular situation.  To the contrary, we believe that district 
courts are well aware of the caseload pressures they face and 
rather zealous in their efforts to control their ever-burgeoning 
responsibilities.  Given the incentives that press our district 
courts to reduce their caseload, we should take particular care 
before second-guessing a district court that rejects a forum non 
conveniens motion after considering the factors that we and the 
Supreme Court have deemed relevant. 
 The factors to be evaluated in assessing whether to 
dismiss for forum non conveniens are by now familiar.  First -- 
and of dispositive significance here -- a district court cannot 
dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds if that decision would 
render a plaintiff unable to pursue his or her action elsewhere.  
That is, since a district court entertaining a forum non 
conveniens motion has jurisdiction over the dispute, it is only 
when some other forum that would also have jurisdiction is better 
suited to adjudicate the controversy that a district court may 
exercise its discretion and dismiss the case.  See Gulf Oil Corp. 
v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506-07 (1947) ("In all cases in which 
the doctrine of forum non conveniens comes into play, it 
  
presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant is 
amenable to process; the doctrine furnishes criteria for choice 
between them").  Thus, as we explained in Lacey v. Cessna 
Aircraft Co., 862 F.2d 38 (3d Cir. 1988) (Lacey I), at the outset 
of its analysis, "[a] district court entertaining a forum non 
conveniens motion must first decide whether an adequate 
alternative forum exists to hear the case."  Id. at 43.  
 Provided that an adequate alternative forum is 
available, the district court must address an additional 
threshold issue when the case is brought by a foreigner -- 
namely, the amount of weight that should be accorded to the 
plaintiff's decision to sue in the United States.4  Then, "the 
district court must consider and balance several private and 
                     
4
.  Ordinarily, a plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled to 
great deference, but the amount of deference is lessened when a 
foreigner has brought suit because we are more skeptical of a 
foreigner's claim that a United States forum is in fact the most 
convenient forum available.  Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 
U.S. 235, 255 (1981).  The fact that a plaintiff is a foreigner 
does not disqualify him or her from suing in the courts of the 
United States, nor does it mean that his or her decision to sue 
in the United States is entitled to no deference.  "Piper[ 
Aircraft]'s language about according less deference to a foreign 
plaintiff's forum choice is `not an invitation to accord a 
foreign plaintiff's selection of an American forum no deference 
since dismissal for forum non conveniens is the exception rather 
than the rule.'"  Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 862 F.2d 38, 
45-46 (3d Cir. 1988) (Lacey I), quoting and adding emphasis to In 
re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, Louisiana on July 9, 
1982, 821 F.2d 1147, 1164 n.26 (5th Cir. 1987).  Although we have 
acknowledged that the deference evaluation cannot be done with 
mathematical precision, the district court must provide some 
reasoned indication of how much deference it is according to the 
particular foreign plaintiff's decision to sue in the United 
States.  Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 932 F.2d 170, 179 (3d Cir. 
1991) (Lacey II). 
  
public interest factors that are relevant to the forum non 
conveniens determination."  Lacey I, 862 F.2d at 43.5  It is the 
defendant's burden to demonstrate that forum non conveniens 
dismissal is warranted.  E.g., Lacey I, 862 F.2d at 43-44; Gulf 
Oil, 330 U.S. at 508.  Surrendra failed to carry that burden 
because it did not make its threshold demonstration that an 
adequate alternative forum was available for this litigation. 
 The Bhatnagars argued in the district court that India 
did not constitute an adequate alternative forum because its 
court system was in a state of virtual collapse.  Plaintiffs 
submitted affidavits from Marc S. Galanter and Shardul Shroff in 
                     
5
.   Certain of these factors were identified in Gulf Oil Corp. 
v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.501 (1947).  The private interest factors 
include such considerations as "the relative ease of access to 
sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for 
attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of 
willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view 
would be appropriate to the action," and other factors "that make 
trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive."  Id. at 508. 
 
 With respect to the public interest factors, the Supreme 
Court has noted that courts should be wary of increasing the 
congestion in domestic courts and forcing jury duty upon those 
who have no relation to or interest in a particular controversy.  
Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508-09.  Additionally, courts should prefer 
to have cases adjudicated in the forum familiar with the law to 
be applied, instead of taking it upon themselves to become 
educated about foreign law.  Id. at 509.  We have further 
explained that "[i]n evaluating the public interest factors the 
district court must `consider the locus of the alleged culpable 
conduct, often a disputed issue, and the connection of that 
conduct to plaintiff's chosen forum.'"  Lacey I, 862 F.2d at 48, 
quoting Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 528 (1988). 
 
 The Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that the list of 
public and private factors in Gulf Oil "is by no means 
exhaustive, and some factors may not be relevant in the context 
of a particular case."  Van Cauwenberghe, 486 U.S. at 528-29. 
  
support of this contention (respectively, the "Galanter Aff." and 
the "Shroff Aff.").  Surrendra responded by proffering the 
affidavit of Talat M. Ansari, who stated that there are numerous 
ways in which litigation can be expedited in India, including 
appointment of special judges, intervention by the Supreme Court 
of India or State High Court, or even requests by the parties for 
expedition.  J.A. 240.  Furthermore, Ansari stated that "given 
the tender age of the child, the Calcutta High Court (which would 
be the court in which the action would have to be filed, given 
the amount of compensation claimed) would undoubtedly grant an 
`expedited hearing' request."  Id.  Surrendra also offered the 
affidavit of Captain Khosla, the company's General Manager, who 
promised that if the district court dismissed this case Surrendra 
would cooperate in seeking expedited treatment of any suit 
brought by the Bhatnagars in India. 
 The district court agreed with the Bhatnagars.  
Crediting their legal experts, the court found that the Indian 
legal system has a tremendous backlog of cases -- so great that 
it could take up to a quarter of a century to resolve this 
litigation if it were filed in India.  J.A. 15-16.  Finding that 
"this remedy is inadequate and unsatisfactory," the court ruled 
that dismissal was inappropriate.  Id at 17.6 
                     
6
.   Although the district court also evaluated the Bhatnagars' 
case under the private and public interest factors of Gulf Oil, 
we do not reach that analysis because of our affirmance on the 
threshold issue of whether an alternative forum is available. 
  
 Surrendra contends on appeal that this analysis 
constituted an abuse of discretion for two central reasons.  The 
company contends that the district court committed legal error in 
finding that mere litigation delay can render an alternative 
forum inadequate, and that in any event the court's fact-finding 
with respect to delay in the Indian legal system was clearly 
erroneous.  We disagree. 
 (a) 
 Surrendra's first attack focuses on the court's premise 
that litigation backlog can render an alternative forum 
inadequate for purposes of forum non conveniens analysis.  
Surrendra argues that the alternative forum factor may be used to 
deny a motion to dismiss only in "extreme cases, such as where an 
action is barred by an alternative forum . . . ."  Appellant-
Cross-Appellee's Br. 14.  Quoting Piper Aircraft, Surrendra 
contends that unless "the remedy provided by the alternative 
forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no 
remedy at all" (Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254), the alternative 
forum must be deemed to be adequate.  Appellant-Cross-Appellee's 
Br. 14.  Thus, although Surrendra does not say so in as many 
words, it apparently believes that the district court committed 
legal error in finding that mere delay can render the Indian 
court system inadequate for purposes of a forum non conveniens 
inquiry. 
 The Supreme Court in Piper Aircraft stated that the 
alternative forum requirement "[o]rdinarily . . . will be 
satisfied when the defendant is `amenable to process' in the 
  
other jurisdiction."  Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22, 
quoting Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 506-07.  Yet the Court qualified 
this statement: 
 In rare circumstances, however, where the 
remedy offered by the other forum is clearly 
unsatisfactory, the other forum may not be an 
adequate alternative, and the initial 
requirement may not be satisfied.  Thus, for 
example, dismissal would not be appropriate 
where the alternative forum does not permit 
litigation of the subject matter of the 
dispute. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 We have never addressed the issue of whether litigation 
delay could render an alternative forum so "clearly 
unsatisfactory" as to be inadequate.  Nor has the Supreme Court 
or any of our sister circuits.  Thus, we face an issue of first 
impression. 
 At the outset of this discussion, it is necessary to 
recognize that delay is an unfortunate but ubiquitous aspect of 
the legal process.  Our own courts suffer from delay, as does any 
other system that attempts to accord some modicum of process.  
E.g., Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 519-20 (1981) 
(noting that delay is pervasive aspect of American courts); see 
also Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee 5-6 (Apr. 2, 
1990).  Because litigation delay is so pervasive, minor delay 
could not possibly serve to undermine the adequacy of an 
alternative forum.  Thus, we agree with those courts that have 
found delays of a few years to be of no legal significance in the 
forum non conveniens calculus.  E.g., Brazilian Investment 
  
Advisory Services, Ltda. v. United Merchants & Manufacturing, 
Inc., 667 F. Supp. 136, 138 (S.D. N.Y. 1987) (delay of up to two 
and one-half years); Broadcasting Rights Int'l Corp. v. Societe 
du Tour de France, S.A.R.L., 708 F. Supp. 83, 85 (S.D. N.Y. 1989) 
(delay of at least two years "and possibly longer"). 
 At some point, however, the prospect of judicial remedy 
becomes so temporally remote that it is no remedy at all.   
Thus, in a variety of circumstances, we and other courts have 
recognized that delay can, in extreme cases, render meaningless a 
putative remedy.  This principle has been recognized, for 
example, in the context of habeas corpus law.  In Burkett v. 
Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208 (3d Cir. 1987), we excused a state 
prisoner's failure to exhaust his state-law remedies before 
seeking federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that he had 
suffered five and one-half years of delay in attempting to 
vindicate himself in state court.  Such delay, we found, "as a 
matter of law excuses exhaustion" (id. at 1218), and we 
reiterated the well-worn but nevertheless truthful aphorism that 
"justice delayed is justice denied" (id.).  The same result has 
obtained in our sister circuits.  E.g., Simmons v. Reynolds, 898 
F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1990) (six-year delay in state appeal excused 
exhaustion requirement in federal habeas action); Harris v. 
Champion, 938 F.2d 1062 (10th Cir. 1991) (four-year delay before 
briefing of prisoner's state appeal and indeterminate amount of 
time before appeal would be decided); Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d 
528 (9th Cir. 1990) (three-year delay). 
  
 Similarly, it is well established in administrative law 
that excessive delay may, in some circumstances, excuse 
exhaustion requirements.  E.g., McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 
140, 147 (1992); Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 
U.S. 561, 587 (1989); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575 n.14 
(1973).  Although part of the concern voiced in such cases 
undoubtedly stems from the possibility that a litigant's 
subsequent court action may be prejudiced by undue postponement, 
courts have also recognized the fundamental principle that a 
remedy too long delayed is tantamount to no remedy at all.  E.g., 
Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 270 U.S. 587, 591 (1926) 
("[p]roperty may be as effectively taken by long-continued and 
unreasonable delay in putting an end to confiscatory rates as by 
an express affirmance of them").  
 Returning to the facts at hand with these legal 
principles in mind, the delay in the Indian legal system 
described by plaintiffs' experts in this case is much more than 
mere minor delay of the sort long tolerated, albeit ruefully, in 
courts of justice.  To the contrary, the delay described by the 
Bhatnagars' experts is profound and extreme.  J.A. 41, 55-65 
(Galanter Aff., characterizing Indian legal system as having 
delays of "Bleak House dimensions"); J.A. 1368, 1374 (Shroff 
Aff., quoting former Chief Justice of India as saying that Indian 
legal system is "almost on the verge of collapse").  The district 
court explained that, "[i]f this case is an `average' case, 
Calcutta's High Court would take 15-20 years to resolve it.  
Shroff Aff., p. 7.  However, the case would also be subject to 
  
another three to six years of appeals after that."  J.A. 16.  
Thus, "[i]f this case were to proceed in the Indian court system 
it might not be resolved until [Urvashi] is an adult."  J.A. 17. 
 Wherever the line might be drawn separating tolerable 
delay from intolerable -- that is, delay that does not vitiate a 
remedy and that which does -- delays of up to a quarter of a 
century fall on the intolerable side of that line.  Delays of 
such egregious magnitude would render a remedy "clearly 
inadequate" under Piper Aircraft.  Thus, we agree with the 
district court that delay of the magnitude described in the 
Bhatnagars' experts' affidavits can render an alternative forum 
inadequate as a matter of law. 
 (b) 
 Surrendra also argues, however, that regardless of 
whether delay of such proportions can render an alternative forum 
inadequate, the district court's fact-finding concerning delay in 
India was fatally flawed in this case.  Specifically, Surrendra 
contends that the district court credited without question the 
plaintiffs' Shroff Affidavit, while ignoring Surrendra's 
affidavits from Ansari and Khosla.  Appellant-Cross-Appellee's 
Br. 14-15.  However, keeping in mind that it was Surrendra's 
burden to prove that India was a viable alternative forum, the 
company's arguments are unpersuasive. 
 Contrary to Surrendra's contention that the district 
court "unquestioningly" accepted the Shroff affidavit, the record 
reflects that the district court relied on both the Shroff and 
Galanter affidavits in making its fact-finding.  J.A. 15 (citing 
  
both Shroff Aff. and Galanter Aff.).  Additionally, despite 
Surrendra's complaints about the district court's reliance on 
plaintiffs' experts' affidavits, the company fails to provide a 
single reason why the Galanter and Shroff affidavits were not 
worthy of credence.  Thus, Surrendra's indictment of the district 
court's reliance on the Bhatnagars' evidence amounts to a 
plaintive assertion that "my experts were better." 
 In addition to failing to undermine the credibility of 
the Bhatnagars' affiants, however, Surrendra also failed to 
counter effectively the Bhatnagars' affidavits with evidence of 
its own demonstrating that the delays in India's legal system 
either were not present or would not make a suit by the 
Bhatnagars in India an exercise in futility.  Surrendra's expert, 
Ansari, stated that there are ways that parties may expedite 
litigation in India, but with one exception he did not state that 
any of the methods he listed would in fact lead to expedited 
treatment of a suit filed by the Bhatnagars.  The sole exception 
was his assertion that the Calcutta High Court "would undoubtedly 
grant an `expedited hearing' request" in Urvashi's case "given 
the tender age of the child . . . ."  J.A. 240.  Evidently, the 
district court did not believe Ansari, because it held that the 
Bhatnagars' suit was "an average case which would probably not 
receive expedited treatment."  J.A. 16. 
 We do not believe this ruling was clearly erroneous.  
Ansari cited no legal authority for his hopeful pronouncement, 
whereas plaintiffs' experts, Galanter and Shroff, provided both 
statistical and anecdotal evidence documenting litigation delays 
  
and tending to show that a suit like the Bhatnagars' would likely 
not receive expedited treatment.7 
 Turning to the Khosla affidavit, the company contends 
that the court "ignored" this evidence, but that also is simply 
not true.  Khosla stated that if the Bhatnagars' suit were 
brought in India, Surrendra would cooperate in seeking expedited 
treatment of the matter and would not take actions that would 
unnecessarily interfere with swift resolution of the case.  He 
also stated that if Surrendra failed to meet his promises, the 
company agreed that the district court could reassume 
jurisdiction over the case.  As Surrendra is forced to concede 
(Appellant-Cross-Appellee's Br. 16), however, the district court 
acknowledged on the record that it had reviewed the Khosla 
affidavit and "recognize[d] that the defendants would not delay 
and would cooperate in requesting the Court to hear the matter 
expeditiously" in India (J.A. 285).  The court was unpersuaded by 
this evidence, noting that even though Surrendra had promised to 
cooperate, "there's nothing that gives me comfort that the matter 
would be heard in India within a reasonable time."  J.A. 285.  It 
                     
7
.   See Galanter Aff., J.A. 60-63 (noting backlog); id. 63-65 
(average duration of reported tort suits 1975-84 was 12 years and 
nine months); id. 68-70 (results of Bhopal litigation "gives 
little reason to believe that the Indian courts presently afford 
an adequate forum for an ordinary personal injury case like this 
one"); Shroff Aff., J.A. 1375 (stating that if suit were filed in 
Calcutta High Court it would "normally" take "about 15-20 years 
before it is finally disposed of since, at present, there are 
only two judges who are singly hearing suits and proceedings for 
final disposal"); id. (quoting retired Chief Justice of India in 
1985 speech as noting that "[t]he delay in the disposal of cases 
has affected not only the ordinary type of cases but also those 
which, by their very nature, call for early relief"). 
  
is clear from the record, therefore, that far from "ignoring" the 
Khosla affidavit, the district court concluded that Surrendra's 
promise to cooperate in trying to expedite litigation in India 
did not amount to proof that the litigation would avoid the 
unreasonable delays that plaintiffs' experts said were endemic in 
that judicial system.  Thus, it was not clearly erroneous for the 
district court to decide that India was not an adequate 
alternative forum based on the evidence before it. 
  
 (c) 
 Surrendra contends that "[e]very other court which has 
considered this issue has found that India courts do provide an 
adequate alternative forum in the forum non conveniens context."  
Appellant-Cross-Appellee's Br. 17.  Even if that were so, it 
would be irrelevant to the issue of whether Surrendra met its 
burden of proof on the issue here.  We note, however, that the 
cases relied upon by Surrendra are factually distinguishable.  In 
In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in 
Dec., 1984, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987), the court merely found 
that the district court's finding that India was a reasonably 
adequate alternative forum did not constitute clear error.  Id. 
at 202-03.  Significantly, the district court in that case had 
found that India was an adequate alternative forum only because 
it expected that the Indian Government would not treat the 
litigation arising from the Bhopal tragedy "in ordinary fashion," 
given that it was the "most significant, urgent and extensive 
litigation ever to arise from a single event . . . ."  In re 
Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in 
December, 1984, 634 F. Supp. 842, 848 (S.D. N.Y. 1986).8 
                     
8
.   In the only other case cited by Surrendra which 
specifically addressed litigation delay in India, the court noted 
that the plaintiff's evidence of delay consisted of "one 
newspaper article, which includes anecdotal references to 
congestion in Indian courts."  Chhawchharia v. Boeing Co., 657 F. 
Supp. 1157, 1160 (S.D. N.Y. 1987).  Such meager support is 
nowhere near as extensive as the evidence submitted by the 
Bhatnagars in this case.  Furthermore, in both Chhawchharia and 
R. Maganlal & Co. v. M.G. Chemical Co., Inc., No. 88 Civ. 4896 
(MJL), 1990 WL 200621 (S.D. N.Y. 1990), also cited by Surrendra, 
the district courts relied upon In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas 
Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987), for the proposition 
  
 (d) 
(..continued) 
that India provided an adequate alternative forum.  As noted in 
the text, relying on that case for that proposition is at least 
misleading, given the special circumstances of the Bhopal 
disaster litigation and the other significant factors that formed 
the basis of the decision.  Surrendra's other putative precedents 
are similarly unpersuasive.  There is no suggestion that the 
issue of delay was briefed in Neo Sack, Ltd. v. Vinmar Impex, 
Inc., 810 F. Supp. 829 (S.D. Tex. 1993), or Vaz v. United States 
Surgical Corp., No. B-90-328 (WWE), 1991 WL 47341 (D. Conn. 
March 13, 1991), neither of which expended any significant effort 
in determining the adequacy of India's legal system as an 
alternative to litigation in the United States.  Surrendra also 
cites ETPM v. Noble Drilling Corp., No. H-92-0682 (S.D. Tex. 
Jan. 12, 1993), but does not even provide us with a copy of the 
case, so that we could not rely upon it even if we were disposed 
to credit an unpublished and unreported district court decision 
from another circuit. 
  
 We should not be read to conclude that the courts of 
India are always inadequate fora, making forum non conveniens 
dismissal inappropriate whenever an Indian national sues in the 
United States.  That is neither the thrust nor the end point of 
our analysis.  In reaching its conclusion that India was an 
inadequate alternative forum in this case, the district court was 
essentially concluding that Surrendra had not met its burden of 
proof on that threshold issue.  We agree.9  It may well be that 
the next defendant to face the same issue faced by Surrendra 
would reach a different result because it would marshal more -- 
or better -- proof.  Furthermore, another district court 
presented with the same raw evidence might reach different 
factual conclusions, and we might be constrained under our 
lenient standards of review to affirm in that case, as well.  
Here, however, the district court did not commit legal error in 
concluding that delay can render a putative alternative forum 
clearly inadequate.  Nor did it commit clear error in its factual 
findings relating to the issue of delay.  That being so, we are 
constrained to affirm the district court's exercise of discretion 
                     
9
.   While defending the district court's finding that India is 
an inadequate alternative to the United States because of the 
delays endemic in the Indian legal system, on appeal the 
Bhatnagars also argue that we can affirm the district court's 
finding in this respect on an alternative ground.  According to 
the Bhatnagars, their claims are now time-barred in India; thus, 
they argue, "the court [sic] in India cannot hear the case since 
the statute of limitations has expired and cannot be waived."  
Appellees-Cross-Appellants' Br. 10.  Because we have found that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that 
India was an inadequate forum based on the evidence of delay 
presented to that court, we do not reach the Bhatnagars' statute 
of limitations argument. 
  
under which it retained jurisdiction over this case and 
adjudicated the Bhatnagars' claims. 
 2. 
 Ten days after losing the forum non conveniens motion, 
Surrendra submitted a motion for reconsideration which included 
the unsworn declaration of Shri Venkiteswaran pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1746.  J.A. 289.10  Venkiteswaran agreed with the 
plaintiffs' experts on Indian law that "if no order for 
expedition is made there could be" significant delay -- "anywhere 
between 10 and 12 years in Bombay and about 10 to 15 years in 
Calcutta" -- before the Bhatnagars' claims were resolved.  J.A. 
292.  However, Venkiteswaran disagreed with Surrendra's own 
original India law expert (Ansari) as well as both of plaintiffs' 
experts by stating that, contrary to the assumptions of those 
experts, the Bhatnagars' case could be adjudicated in India as an 
admiralty case.  Id.  Treating the suit as an admiralty action, 
Venkiteswaran stated, would reduce the delay to "4 to 5 years if 
the plaintiffs pursue their action diligently and if the 
defendants are not obstructive in having the matter heard."  Id.  
In its motion for reconsideration, Surrendra argued that the 
Venkiteswaran affidavit demonstrated that the court had erred in 
finding that India was an inadequate forum, and that the court 
had abused its discretion in evaluating the public and private 
interest factors implicated by the case.  Alternatively, 
                     
10
.   28 U.S.C. § 1746 permits parties to submit unsworn 
declarations in lieu of sworn statements in certain 
circumstances. 
  
Surrendra requested that the district court certify the forum non 
conveniens issue for immediate review.  The district court denied 
this motion without a written opinion, noting in its order that 
"[t]he court considered the factors mentioned in the Motion in 
reaching its original conclusion."  J.A. 22. 
 Surrendra contends on appeal that the district court 
abused its discretion in failing to change its mind and dismiss 
this case on forum non conveniens grounds in the face of 
Surrendra's new evidence.11  We disagree for two reasons.  First, 
Surrendra's motion for reconsideration strikes us as a classic 
attempt at a "second bite at the apple."  Having failed in its 
first effort to persuade the court to dismiss on forum non 
conveniens grounds, Surrendra simply changed theories and tried 
again, contradicting its earlier evidence with its factual 
support for the new theory.  We have explained that although we 
are not "prepared to enunciate a rule precluding [a] district 
court from reconsidering the issue" of forum non conveniens "on 
an expanded record in all circumstances," nevertheless we "assume 
that such reconsideration [will] be limited to exceptional 
circumstances."  Lony v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 935 F.2d 
604, 608 (3d Cir. 1991).  Whatever other circumstances may 
                     
11
.   In its brief, Surrendra also suggests that, in the 
alternative, the district court should have granted the company's 
request for interlocutory review of the forum non conveniens 
decision under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).  Appellant-Cross-Appellee's 
Br. 18 n.1.  The company does not appeal the denial of 
certification, however, so we need not address the knotty 
question of whether we could take jurisdiction over a denial of 
Rule 54(b) certification.  See Republic of the Philippines v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 81 (3d Cir. 1994). 
  
justify reconsideration, mere presentation of arguments or 
evidence seriatim does not.  See Brambles USA, Inc. v. Blocker, 
735 F. Supp. 1239, 1240 (D. Del. 1990) (reargument "should not be 
used as a means to argue new facts or issues that inexcusably 
were not presented to the court in the matter previously 
decided"). 
 In any event, the district court was entitled to 
disbelieve the Venkiteswaran declaration.  Venkiteswaran 
contradicted the Ansari affidavit, which -- according to 
Surrendra in its earlier papers -- had accurately stated the law.  
Thus, the district court may reasonably have concluded that the 
putative new "expert" testimony was of no evidentiary value.  
Furthermore, Venkiteswaran provided the district court with no 
citation to legal authority suggesting that his conclusion that 
the Bhatnagars could bring an admiralty action in India was 
entitled to any weight.  Given the incompatibility of his 
testimony with that of Ansari and the Bhatnagars' experts, the 
district court may reasonably have concluded that it should not 
credit the newly proffered opinion.  We cannot conclude that the 
district court abused its discretion in denying the motion for 
reconsideration. 
  
 3. 
 After denial of the motion for reconsideration, 
discovery proceeded apace for another two and one-half months.  
Then, on the day after the Bhatnagars' trial brief was submitted, 
Surrendra filed a Motion for Relief from the Order Denying 
Claimant's Motion to Dismiss on Grounds of Forum Non Conveniens.  
See J.A. 9.  In this motion, Surrendra again contended that the 
district court should reconsider the motion to dismiss.  This 
time, Surrendra premised its request for relief on allegations 
that the Bhatnagars, in a wilful abuse of discovery, had 
misrepresented their immigration status to Surrendra and the 
court.  In fact, Surrendra contended, the Bhatnagars had been 
illegal aliens when they first brought their action in 
Pennsylvania.  Had the Bhatnagars not wilfully misrepresented 
their immigration status to the court, the company claimed, the 
court would have granted the forum non conveniens motion because 
the withheld information would have negated the court's findings 
of fact -- namely, that Urvashi intended to reside in the United 
States until all medical treatment was completed and that she 
sought to remain permanently in the United States, if permitted.  
Surrendra apparently also contended that the motion to dismiss 
should be reconsidered and granted as a sanction for the 
Bhatnagars' bad faith during discovery. 
 The district court rejected this third bite at the 
apple, noting that this case was "not an immigration appeal."  
J.A. 26.  Furthermore, although the court stated that the 
"court's role is not to determine . . . whether the plaintiffs 
  
reside here legally," the court explained that it had "considered 
the possibility that the minor plaintiff could be deported" at 
the hearing on Surrendra's initial motion to dismiss.  Id.  
(Indeed, the court had done so, apparently aware at that time 
that the plaintiffs were potentially residing in the United 
States illegally.  J.A. 272.)  Additionally, relying on Hagl v. 
Jacob Stern & Sons, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 779, 784 (E.D. Pa. 1975), 
the court ruled that "even if the minor plaintiff is an illegal 
alien, she still has the right to use this country's courts to 
sue those persons who allegedly physically injured her."  
J.A. 26. 
 The district court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying this second motion for reconsideration, which amounted to 
a third motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens, 
and which asserted grounds already briefed to the district court.  
Reconsideration "should not be granted where it would merely 
`allow wasteful repetition of arguments already briefed, 
considered and decided.'"  Brambles USA, 735 F. Supp. at 1240, 
quoting Weissman v. Fruchtman, 124 F.R.D. 559, 560 (S.D. N.Y. 
1989).  Furthermore, despite Surrendra's protestations of bad 
faith and lack of candor by the Bhatnagars, the evidence does not 
compel the conclusion that the Bhatnagars acted with bad faith, 
and the district court found no such bad faith.  In short, 
Surrendra has provided no reason to upset the district court's 
discretionary decision to deny this final motion for 
reconsideration. 
  
 B. 
 Turning to the merits of the trial, Surrendra next 
contends that the court erred in finding the company negligent 
under Indian law.12  Surrendra's challenge takes two forms.  
First, the company alleges that the court erred in finding that 
liability could be imposed upon the company on the ground that 
Surrendra's duty officer should have known of Urvashi's presence 
on the bridge at the time of the accident.  Alternatively, 
Surrendra argues that the court erred in denying Surrendra's 
motion for a directed verdict on the ground that there was 
insufficient evidence either that Surrendra's steward and 
helmsman had acted within the scope of their employment or that 
the duty officer had become aware of Urvashi's presence on the 
bridge.  Surrendra's arguments, however, leave us unpersuaded. 
                     
12
.   In their cross-appeal, the Bhatnagars contend that the 
district court erred in concluding that Indian law applied.  They 
reason that because Indian and American law are essentially 
identical with respect to principles of negligence, the court did 
not have to find that Indian law applied because there was no 
"true conflict" of law.  See Coons v. Lawlor, 804 F.2d 28, 30 (3d 
Cir. 1986).  We agree with the Bhatnagars that Indian and 
American negligence law are essentially the same with respect to 
duty, breach, cause-in-fact and proximate cause, as well as how 
one determines the scope of the duty owed by the defendant to the 
plaintiff, if any.  However, as we discuss infra pp. 33-36, 
Indian courts award damages in a manner different from American 
courts.  Thus, the district court did not err in making a choice 
of law inquiry.  Furthermore, despite the Bhatnagars' contentions 
to the contrary, it is clear that, under Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 
U.S. 571 (1958), Indian law applies to this dispute.  The law of 
the flag and the allegiance of the parties to India at the time 
of the accident point strongly towards the application of Indian 
law, and the Bhatnagars' subsequent sojourn in the United States 
does not create sufficient counterbalance to require application 
of domestic law to the dispute. 
  
 The district court made the following findings of fact 
relevant to this portion of the appeal: 
 16. On March 17, 1991, the ship's steward, Mr. Abdul 
Mutalib, took the plaintiff, Urvashi, to the 
bridge of the vessel. 
 
 17. At the time in question the duty watch officer was 
on the bridge together with the duty helmsman.  
The duty watch officer's duties included enforcing 
the ship's rules that the Bridge of the ship was 
off limits to all unauthorized persons. 
 
 18. At approximately 4:00 p.m. while the plaintiff and 
Mr. Mutalib were on the bridge, the helmsman 
picked up plaintiff Urvashi and placed her on a 
ledge in front of the clear view screen on the 
bridge. . . . 
 
 20. The helmsman of the vessel showed the minor 
plaintiff how to put her hand on the clear screen 
a [sic] part of a "game."  He feigned putting the 
palm of his hand on the clear screen [sic] and 
asked her to do likewise.  When minor plaintiff 
placed her hand on the clear view screen, her 
right hand and portions of her arm were injured.  
The helmsman fainted on the bridge. 
 
 21. The defendant admits that the acts of the helmsman 
and steward were negligent.  The steward was 
taking tea to the duty officer on the bridge at 
the time just before the accident. 
 
 22. The duty officer, who is in charge of the bridge, 
did not stop the helmsman and steward from acting 
negligently.  The duty officer should have known 
of their permitting the minor plaintiff to play on 
the bridge. 
 
 23. The duty officer, acting for the defendant, 
breached a duty of care owed to plaintiffs [sic] 
by permitting plaintiff to be on the bridge, an 
unauthorized area, and on the ledge in front of 
the clear view screen.  The duty officer should 
have known of the minor plaintiff's presence on 
the bridge. 
 
 24. The duty officer's failure to stop the helmsman's 
and steward's negligent acts was a substantial 
  
factor in bringing about the harm to the 
plaintiff. 
 
 25. Plaintiff's injury was proximately caused and 
caused in fact by defendant's breach of duty owed 
to plaintiff. 
 
 26. It was reasonably foreseeable to the duty officer 
that plaintiff was in danger of sustaining injury 
on the bridge in general and on the ledge in front 
of the clear view screen in particular. 
J.A. 31-33.  As these findings of fact indicate, the district 
court found that the duty officer had a duty to prevent Urvashi 
and other unauthorized persons from being on the bridge and to 
enforce safety precautions during his watch.  This finding is 
amply supported in the record by the unambiguous testimony of the 
Captain of the APJ KARAN.  J.A. 1055.  The duty officer breached 
that duty by failing to act in a manner that would have permitted 
him to avert the negligent actions of the steward and helmsman. 
 Contrary to Surrendra's argument, the district court's 
decision did not constitute a finding of strict liability.  In 
fact, we find Surrendra's contention quite puzzling.  It is 
permissible to find that someone breached a duty of care owed to 
another without actually knowing that a victim has been harmed 
until after the fact, so long as a reasonable person would know 
that acting or failing to act would create an unreasonable risk 
of harm to a class of persons that includes the plaintiff.  See 
generally Restatement (Second) of Torts § 281, comment "c" 
(1965).  Surrendra concedes that under Indian law, like American 
law, negligence  
 consists in the neglect of ordinary care or 
skill towards a person to whom the defendant 
owes a duty of observing ordinary care . . . 
  
the standard of care which would determine 
whether or not there has been a breach of 
duty is that of a reasonable person who must 
be presumed to have foreseen the consequence, 
or at least, ought to have seen it. 
Appellant-Cross-Appellee's Br. 37.  Under this standard, the 
district court could properly conclude that, had the duty officer 
(Surrendra's agent, acting within the scope of his employment) 
reasonably fulfilled his duty to enforce the rules of the bridge, 
Urvashi would not have been harmed.  Thus, the district court did 
not err in finding Surrendra liable. 
 Furthermore, because of this conclusion, it was 
entirely proper for the district court to reject Surrendra's 
motion for directed verdict based on the sufficiency of the 
evidence.  It did not matter whether the plaintiffs had 
established that the steward and helmsman were acting within the 
scope of their employment.13  Nor did it matter whether there was 
evidence that the duty officer actually knew of Urvashi's 
presence on the bridge, given that the district court had 
reasonably concluded that if the duty officer had been performing 
his job properly, she would not have been.  Thus, the district 
court did not err in denying the motion for a directed verdict. 
                     
13
.   Although we see no reason why the court could not have 
concluded that Surrendra was liable through the actions of the 
helmsman and steward, the court made no findings to that effect. 
  
 C. 
 Surrendra next contends that the district court erred 
in awarding Urvashi a total of $189,331.00 in damages, including 
$39,133 in pecuniary losses and $150,000 in non-pecuniary losses, 
"including pain and suffering, disability, disfigurement, loss of 
enjoyment of life, mental anguish and emotional injury, past, 
present and future as a result of the accident . . . ."  J.A. 37.  
According to the company, the district court's non-pecuniary 
damages award was grossly excessive under Indian law.14  We agree 
with Surrendra that the district court erred in its application 
of Indian damages principles regarding non-pecuniary damages. 
 Under Indian law, three principles govern awards of 
"non-pecuniary" or "general" damages:  "(1) Compensation must be 
reasonable and must be assessed with moderation[;] (2) Regard 
must be had to awards in comparable cases[; and] (3) sums awarded 
should, to a considerable extent, be conventional."  J.A. 1444 
(Opinion of S.C. Pratap (Sept. 16, 1993));15 J.A. 1397 (Affidavit 
of Shardul S. Shroff (Sept. 30, 1993)) ("Shroff Aff. II")  As the 
experts for the Bhatnagars and Surrendra agree, in applying these 
                     
14
.   Surrendra does not appear to contest the district court's 
award of $39,133.00 in pecuniary damages.  See Appellant-Cross-
Appellee's Third Step Reply Br. 21.  In any event, we find no 
error in the district court's award of pecuniary damages.  See, 
e.g., J.A. 1443 (discussing permissible pecuniary damages under 
Indian law). 
15
.   This document, an opinion by a former judge of the High 
Court of Bombay and ex-Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh, was 
accompanied by an unsworn declaration of Shri Venkiteswaran under 
28 U.S.C. § 1746 (see J.A. 1466), and is admissible under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 44.1 for purposes of determining the law of India. 
  
principles Indian courts attempt to make awards comparable and 
uniform among Indian tort victims.  J.A. 1398 (Shroff Aff. II); 
1448 (Pratap Opinion).  Thus, Urvashi was entitled to an award of 
non-pecuniary damages, but she was not entitled to an award 
comparable to what a similarly situated American would receive in 
this country.  Rather, the district court should have sought to 
award an amount comparable to what a similarly situated plaintiff 
would have received in India.16 
 Viewed in this light, the district court's award of 
$150,000 in non-pecuniary damages may be grossly excessive.  One 
American dollar in early 1995 is worth approximately 31.39 
rupees.17  Thus, the district court's award, in rupees, was in 
the neighborhood of Rs. 4,708,500.  The parties' experts have 
provided a number of examples of compensation by Indian court 
victims for various personal injuries, but the highest award 
mentioned is less than 20 percent of the amount awarded in this 
                     
16
.   As the Supreme Court explained in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 
U.S. 571 (1952), "[t]he purpose of a conflict-of-laws doctrine is 
to assure that a case will be treated in the same way under the 
appropriate law regardless of the fortuitous circumstances which 
often determine the forum."  Id. at 591. 
17
.   The Wall Street Journal (Feb. 28, 1995) p. C6.  Of course, 
the relevant exchange rate is actually the one in effect on the 
date of the verdict and judgment in the district court.  However, 
Surrendra asserted that the exchange rate of rupees to dollars 
was "more than" 31:1 during the relevant period (Appellant-Cross-
Appellee's Br. 42, and the Bhatnagars do not contest this 
assertion.  Thus, the calculation in the text is a reasonable 
approximation of the value of the district court's award in 
rupees.   
  
case, and it was awarded for an injury that was much more serious 
than that suffered by Urvashi.18 
 Because the award in this case was so disproportionate 
to the amounts awarded in other Indian tort cases, we will vacate 
the award of non-pecuniary damages and remand with instructions 
to reassess those damages in accordance with Indian law.  We 
leave it to the district court to determine whether there is 
sufficient material in the record to make that determination, or 
whether supplemental briefing and evidence will be necessary.19 
                     
18
.   The amounts awarded in the cases cited by the Bhatnagars' 
damage expert, Shroff, range from 5500 rupees (for damage to a 
left arm) to 143,400 rupees (for an "arm injury"), although in 
neither of these extreme cases does Shroff note whether the 
figure is for both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, or only 
non-pecuniary.  J.A. 1400.  Surrendra's damages expert, Pratap, 
describes a great many more cases with a broader range of awards 
(id. 1448-56), but the largest award listed was 857,352 rupees, 
awarded to a former judge who was injured in an automobile 
accident and suffered 100 percent disability and paraplegia below 
the waist. 
19
.  We also note an apparent scrivener's error in the district 
court's rendition of judgment:  also the court's award amounts to 
only $189,133 ($39,133 + $150,000), the court's judgment was 
rendered in favor of Urvashi Bhatnagar for $189,331.  J.A. 40.  
Since we are vacating this judgment so that the district court 
can properly determine non-pecuniary damages under Indian law, 
the typographical error is of no moment because the district 
court will undoubtedly correct its calculation upon remand. 
  
 III. 
 We have already addressed and rejected one of the 
contentions raised in the Bhatnagars' cross-appeal -- namely, 
that the district court erred in concluding that the law of India 
applied in this case.  See supra n.12.  However, the Bhatnagars 
also argue that the court erred in failing to award damages to 
Kalpana Bhatnagar, and that the court erred in rendering a 
"clearly inadequate" award in favor of Urvashi.20  We address 
these contentions below. 
                     
20
.   The Bhatnagars also contend that the district court erred 
in admitting certain testimony of the Captain of the APJ KARAN 
which the Bhatnagars contend was hearsay.  However, given that 
this testimony pertained to the finding of negligence against 
Surrendra, and given that we have affirmed that finding of 
negligence, we find that this claim of error is moot. 
  
 A. 
 The district court found that Kalpana Bhatnagar had 
"not demonstrated a loss of service as a result of plaintiff 
Urvashi's injury."  J.A. 37.  In their cross-appeal, the 
Bhatnagars contend that this finding was erroneous, but they 
provide no evidence that damages for loss of services are 
compensable under Indian law (see Appellees-Cross-Appellants' Br. 
43-45), whereas Surrendra's expert opined that Kalpana's claim is 
"unsustainable" under Indian law (J.A. 1458).  Furthermore, the 
Bhatnagars failed to demonstrate that Kalpana lost any of 
Urvashi's services, even assuming that compensation for such loss 
is cognizable under Indian law.  For these two independent 
reasons, the district court did not commit error in denying 
Kalpana recovery. 
 B. 
 The Bhatnagars also contend that the district court 
erred in awarding a "clearly inadequate" award in favor of 
Urvashi.  Their argument, however, is confined to the district 
court's "non-pecuniary" award, which we have already explained in 
section II(C) must be vacated and remanded for redetermination 
because of its excessiveness under Indian law.  We reject the 
Bhatnagars' claim that Urvashi's award was inadequate for the 
reasons we noted in finding that the award was grossly excessive 
under Indian law. 
  
 IV. 
 Prophets of litigation doom may contend that our forum 
non conveniens analysis in this case will cause a flood of 
litigation as foreigners rush to the United States to bring 
claims that have nothing to do with our nation, our people or our 
business.  We recognize that the possibility of securing a trial 
before an American jury, under American law, provides a strong 
draw to foreigners.  Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has 
recognized that our courts are "extremely attractive to foreign 
plaintiffs."  Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 252. 
 Still, we are not troubled by the precedential effect 
of our decision.  A careful reading of section II(A) makes clear 
just how narrow and unusual are the facts and circumstances of 
this case.  Additionally, it is likely that future defendants 
will develop a record (if such can be made) adequate to support 
dismissal in similar circumstances.  Finally, we have confidence 
that our district courts well understand the weight of their 
dockets and will not hesitate to dismiss those actions that have 
no business being before them.  Of course, if they do not, we 
will exercise our superintendence at that time, but we see no 
reason to reverse a defensible decision to retain jurisdiction in 
the face of a claim of forum non conveniens based upon mere 
speculation that our courts may have to exercise their discretion 
more often in the future. 
 The judgment of the district court will be affirmed 
except as to the award for non-pecuniary damages.  As to the non-
pecuniary damages, the judgment of the district court will be 
  
vacated and the case remanded to the district court to 
redetermine those damages in accordance with Indian law.  
Two-thirds of plaintiffs' costs will be taxed against the 
defendants. 
_________________________ 
 
 
 
